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1. Introductory Consideration
The regulation of banks as financial intermediaries 
is important for two reasons − their systemic impact 
on the economy and their role as deposit takers and 
loan providers. The role of capital as an indicator 
of bank soundness has been the main driver for the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision initiative 
since its inception. The Capital Accord (Basel I) is a 
“global” standard that initially sets guidelines for in-
ternationally active banks. It was introduced by the 
G-10 countries plus Luxembourg and Spain in 1988 
in order to overcome the lack of harmonised capital 
adequacy requirements and ultimately establish an 
equal playing field for the banks. 
In general, the Basel accords (Basel I, II, and III) are 
not a guarantee for the prevention of bank crises. 
Instead, they aim to provide some assurance to the 
stakeholders and the public by indicating the degree 
of strength in the banking sector. Increased inter-
relatedness of the global banking system creates a 
domino effect on emerging countries. Therefore, 
PERSPECTIVES OF BASEL III: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
UDK: 336.71(497.6)
Review article 
Received: February 29, 2016
Accepted for publishing: April 24, 2016
Emira Kozarević 
Tuzla University 
Faculty of Economics 
Univerzitetska 8, 
75000 Tuzla,
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
emira.kozarevic@untz.ba 
Phone: +38761178821 
 
Nedžad Polić
Zenica University & Hifa Oil d.o.o.
Faculty of Economics
Fakultetska 3,
72000 Zenica,
Bosnia and Herzegovina
nedzad.polic@ef.unze.ba
Phone: +38761477037
Abstract
The latest Basel Accord, which relies on the New Capital Accord (i.e. Basel II) and whose basic goals have 
been, from a normative standpoint, enhancing the banking sector’s ability to absorb the losses arising from 
economic distresses like the global financial crisis (2007-2009), improving risk management and govern-
ance, and strengthening the bank’s transparency and disclosures, operationally emphasises the need to 
improve the quality and quantity of capital components, liquidity standards, and leverage ratio. The imple-
mentation of the Accord in developed economies started at the beginning of 2013 and the overall transition 
period from the Basel II framework should end by the year 2019. But as far as emerging economies are 
concerned, there are several issues on the road of implementation, such as necessary (technical) skills and 
expertise of bank staff as well as their supervisory institutions, sophisticated internal rating mechanisms 
and capacity, significant amount of new information and recordkeeping, etc. This paper discusses real and 
potential effects of Basel III in both developed and emerging economies. A special emphasis is given to the 
banking sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Keywords: International banking standards, Basel accords, Basel III, effects, developed economies, emerg-
ing economies, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
212
Emira Kozarević, Nedžad Polić: Perspectives of Basel III: Empirical evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina  
God. XXIX, BR. 1/2016. str. 211-229
ensuring that the global banking regulatory stand-
ards meet the unique needs of emerging economies 
is especially important. Despite the fact that the 
Basel Committee has no supranational authority to 
supervise the implementation of its standards, its 
accords have now taken the proportions of a glob-
ally accepted standard for bank capital adequacy.
The main goal of this paper is to enlighten the ef-
fects (real as well as potential) of the newest Basel 
Accord (Basel III) on both developed and emerging 
economies. The special research attention is given 
to the Bosnia and Herzegovina banking sector, its 
current state and perspectives according to adop-
tion of Basel standards, in general, and Basel III, in 
particular. The paper is organised as follows. The 
first part of this paper provides an overview of the 
Basel III requirements. The second part discusses 
their impact and implementation challenges in 
developed economies. The third part of the paper 
contains a critique and perspective of Basel III ap-
plication in emerging countries, with a particular 
emphasis on the case of the Bosnia and Herzego-
vina banking sector. Although the paper has a more 
descriptive rather than normative goal, it provides 
some general recommendations resulting from the 
analysis.
2. A Brief Overview of Basel III
The Basel Committee, as an institutionalised 
body for the harmonisation of banking standards, 
reached a consensus regarding the Basel III frame-
work on 26/07/2010. On 30/11/2010, the G-20 lead-
ers endorsed the framework at the summit in Seoul, 
South Korea. 
Table 1 Capital framework in Basel III
Basically, Basel III relies on the Basel II framework 
and has three objectives that are articulated by the 
Committee: address the issues which led to the 
global financial crisis (2007-2009) and the lessons 
learned from the crisis,1 improve risk management 
and governance, and strengthen bank’s transpar-
ency and disclosures. 
The Basel III Accord is characterized as a successive 
process in which banks are to increase the primary 
capital ratio from 2% to 7% in several years to come. 
The total implementation of Basel III is expected on 
01/01/2019. Regulators believe that during a crisis 
banks may temporarily reduce the ratio to 4.5%, but 
are not allowed to pay bonuses and dividends until 
they return the ratio to 7% (Table 1). 
The dynamics of the realization plan for individual 
stages of the Basel III project includes the following 
(Ganić, 2012: 194-195):
- The beginning of implementation of new 
standards at the national level is planned for 
01/01/2013. However, national regulators are 
expected to transfer and build the rules into na-
tional legislation prior to this date. Also, as of 
01/01/2013, banks are expected to fulfil and keep 
the following new minimum requirements as fol-
lows:
• minimum 3.5% of common stocks compared to 
the risk-weighted assets,
• minimum 4.5% of the primary capital (Tier 1), 
compared to the risk-weighted assets, and
• minimum 8% of the total bank capital compared 
to the risk-weighted assets.
- Minimum requirements in terms of the share-
holders’ equity (common stocks) and primary 
character capital are planned for gradual imple-
mentation from 01/01/2013 to 01/01/2015. 
Paid-in capital – 
common stocks 
(after deductions)
Primary 
character capital 
(Tier 1)
Total capital
Minimum requirements 4.5% 6% 8%
Capital buffer 2.5%
Minimum requirements plus capital buffer zone 7% 8.5% 10.5%
Counter cyclic buffer [common stocks and other 
categories of capital stock (i.e. equity share) for total 
loss absorption]
0-2.5%
Source: Authors
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 The phased introduction dynamics predicted that 
as of 01/01/2013, minimum ratio of common 
stocks and risk-weighted assets was to increase 
from the present 2% to 3.5%, while the primary 
character capital was to increase from 4% to 4.5%. 
As of 01/01/2014 further increases of the ratios 
were planned so that ordinary shares reach 4% 
and the primary character capital 5.5%, while the 
requirement for common stocks would be 4.5% 
and 6% for the primary character capital as of 
01/01/2015. 
 The demanded coefficient of capital adequacy was 
to stay at 8% of the bank’s risk-weighted assets 
and no stage introduction was to be implemented 
here. The difference between the total capital de-
mands, that is, the rate of capital adequacy of 8%, 
and the requirements for the primary character 
capital could be compensated by more qualified 
forms of shareholders’ equity.
- Regulatory adaptation (deduction items and pru-
dential filters) includes deductions from paid-in 
common stocks for the amounts above 15% of 
the total limit for investment of a financial insti-
tution, services of mortgage rights, and deferred 
tax assets. Deductions from common stocks 
are expected to be completely eliminated as of 
01/01/2018. In particular, stage adaptation to reg-
ulatory requirements starts with deductions from 
common stocks up to 20% on 01/01/2014, 40% 
from 01/01/2015, 60% as of 01/01/2016, 80% from 
01/01/2017, and finally 100% as of 01/01/2018.
- Banks are expected to gradually introduce the 
capital buffer zone in the period from 01/01/2016 
until the end of 2018, with it becoming com-
pletely obligatory starting on 01/01/2019. Among 
other things, banks were expected to start creat-
ing capital buffer zones until 01/01/2016 in the 
amount of 0.625% of the risk-weighted assets, 
while each following year this amount would be 
increased by an additional 0.625%. That way the 
threshold amounting to 2.5% of the risk-weighted 
assets would be reached by 01/01/2019. Econo-
mies creating excessive rates of credit growth 
have a discretionary right to impose shorter pe-
riods of transition and introduce limits for the 
buffer zone prior to the arranged deadlines. 
In addition to the Basel II capital ratio, Basel III re-
quires banks to respect additional ratios, such as 
the leverage ratio, the liquidity coverage ratio, and 
the net stable funding ratio. The risk-based Capital 
Ratio (CR) requires that 8% of risk-weighted assets 
are covered by Tier 1-capital plus Tier 2-capital. The 
volume-based Leverage Ratio (LR) requires banks 
to hold 3% T1-capital against their total assets. The 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) stipulates that sta-
ble-funding weighted assets are to be 100% covered 
by stable-funding weighted liabilities. The Liquid-
ity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requires that outflows are 
100% covered by inflows plus the (haircut-weighted) 
liquidity reserve (Schmaltz et al., 2014: 311-313).2
Reactions to Basel III are both positive and negative. 
The officials of the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) stated that the new regulations on the 
required capital of banks would make the world “a 
safer place”. Robert Peston, the BBC business editor, 
claims that the new regulations are “the most im-
portant global initiative for learning the lessons in 
the global financial crisis of 2008 and its correction”. 
However, there are some who accuse the new regu-
lations of being “mild” towards banks. One of the 
creators of these regulations, the former governor of 
the Dutch Central Bank, Nout Wellink, warned that 
the banking sector would have to collect hundreds 
of billions of euros in order to fulfil requirements. 
He stated that “for years, banks would have to re-
tain their profit, not dividing it to the shareholders 
or using it to pay the bonuses. Furthermore, some 
banks would have to provide additional resources 
on the capital market”, OECD estimated that the im-
plementation of Basel III would reduce annual gross 
domestic product growth by 0.05-0.15% (Köffer, 
2014: 11).
The new liquidity rules are expected to create a 
significant impact on banks. Their implementation 
is expected to lead to more capital- and liquidity-
efficient business models and products. In particu-
lar, the rules relating to NSFR will limit the banks’ 
ability to perform maturity transformation, one of 
the core banking functions. Accordingly, complying 
with the new standards might also have an impact 
on bank performance, such as reduced profitability 
and a squeeze on lending margins as well as sys-
temic effects (Dietrich, Hess & Wanzenried, 2014: 
13-25).  
 
2. Basel III and Developed Countries: Impact 
and Implementation Challenges
According to the BIS, implementation statistics 
regarding Basel I as a voluntary standard are im-
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pressive. From 2001, over 100 countries worldwide 
had implemented Basel I. Furthermore, from 2004, 
these countries intended to implement Basel II − 
13 were Basel Committee Members and 88 were 
non-Basel Committee Members. As of 2008, 105 
countries had either implemented Basel II (57) or 
intended to implement Basel II (48), a total of 13 
Basel Committee Members and 92 non-Basel Com-
mittee Members. 
From 2008, the Basel Committee country mem-
bership expanded to include 27 Members. What is 
important is that this allows emerging countries to 
join the negotiations about what the “global” super-
visory framework would look like. Argentina, Chi-
na, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, and Turkey are some of the countries 
whose admission can be expected to bring differ-
ent perspectives into the work of the Committee. 
However, Basel II appears to show extremely west-
centric characteristics. 
Interestingly, the BIS found that 9,400 supervisory 
institutions would require training in the imple-
mentation of Basel II. It also found that in terms of 
implementing Pillar 2 (i.e. Supervisory Review Pro-
cess), the biggest hurdles would be in technical and 
human resources related to supervision. 
Source: Authors 
By 2008, most jurisdictions globally had postponed 
implementation of Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 (i.e. Market 
Discipline or Enhanced Discipline) to 2015, later 
than originally expected in 2006. The BIS estimates 
this is due to more preparation being required than 
initially estimated for implementation of these pil-
lars (Dissanayake, 2012a: 358).
As far as Basel III is concerned, it is mentioned 
above that it relies on the Basel II framework, as a 
three-pillar structure, but with more rigorous Pillar 
1 − Minimum Capital Requirements (see Figure 1). 
By using the three-pillar concept, the Basel Com-
mittee attempts to achieve a more “risk sensitive” 
framework (Bessis, 2011: 233) as well as a more ho-
listic approach to risk management, which would 
focus on the interaction among different types of 
risks. At the same time, the three-pillar concept 
clearly indicates that there is a difference between 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable risks.
Pillar/tier one requires that banks calculate mini-
mum capital charge related to the regulatory capi-
tal, with the aim of minimum capital quantification 
being related more to the economically potential 
loss of banks. According to Basel II, there is the cost 
of capital for credit risk, market risk, and for the 
first time, for operational risks. 
Emira Kozarević, Nedžad Polić: Perspectives of Basel III: Empirical evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Figure 1 The three-pillar structure of the Basel II framework
God. XXIX, BR. 1/2016. str. 211-229
215
UDK: 336.71(497.6) / Review article 
While the treatment of market risk has been rela-
tively unchanged since the Basel I Amendment in 
1996, the cost of capital for credit risk has been 
significantly changed. When calculating the cost of 
capital for credit and operational risks, banks have 
a choice of three approaches to sensitivity increase 
and risk complexity: basic indicator approach, 
standardized approach, and advanced measure-
ment approach (internal methodology with the us-
age of quantitative and qualitative criteria). 
Any quantitative approach to risk management 
should be “built” into the functional management 
structure of an institution. This is why the best 
practice of risk management imposes clear limita-
tions for institution organization, namely the board 
of directors, management, employees, and internal 
and external revision processes. In special cases, the 
board of directors takes over the final responsibility 
for the failure to “landscape” risk and the formula-
tion of the institution’s “appetite” for risk. This is 
where pillar/tier two is introduced. This important 
pillar, which is marked as the supervisory review 
process, helps local regulators make various checks 
and put the balances in order. This pillar starts with 
the need for effective audit of the bank’s internal as-
sessment of the total risk and enables management 
to practise “the sound” of assessment, leaving the 
appropriate capital for different risks aside. 
Furthermore, in order to fulfil the promise of grow-
ing regulation also reducing the systemic risk, clear 
guidelines were requested in terms of reporting on 
risks taken by financial institutions. Pillar/tier three 
requests the establishment of market discipline by 
better publication of risk measures and other infor-
mation relevant for risk management. Banks would 
be forced to provide a better insight into the ade-
quacy of their capitalization.3 
When it comes preparing for Basel III, Ketcha 
(2014: 18-19) emphasized that all the banks will 
need an effective capital adequacy process. To be 
fully effective, the process should be built using the 
following seven principles:
1. sound risk management fundamentals,
2. effective loss-estimation methodologies, 
3. solid resource-estimation methodologies,
4. sufficient capital adequacy impact assessment,
5. comprehensive capital policy and capital plan-
ning,
6. robust internal controls, and 
7. effective governance. 
In their study conducted on a sample of sixty-eight 
East Asian banks, Chalermchatvichien, Jumre-
ornvong & Jiraporn (2014: 28-46) revealed that, by 
requiring more capital stability, Basel III would have 
improved the bank’s Z-score.4 
Despite the fact that the actual impact of Basel III 
will not be known for several years, in its study 
about the initial effects of Basel III on capital, cred-
it, and international competitiveness, launched in 
2014, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) found that Basel III capital requirements 
will lead to a modest decline in lending activities (as 
most banks may not need to raise additional capital 
to meet the minimum requirements) and a modest 
incline in the loan rate.5 Basel III serves, in part, to 
limit competitive disparities due to differences in 
capital standards, but because of jurisdictional di-
versities there are limitations to the full harmonisa-
tion (Mendoza, 2015: 35-37).
3. A Critique and Perspectives of Basel III 
in Emerging Economies, with a Focus on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
3.1 (Im)possibilities of Basel III Implementation 
in Emerging Economies
Although the Basel accords are intended for imple-
mentation by internationally active banks and in 
developed economies, other economies (and, there-
fore, emerging) are also forced to implement the ac-
cords due to international regulatory and competi-
tiveness matters. For example, in Asia, at least nine 
countries had implemented or expected to imple-
ment Basel II by 2010 (e.g. India, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand had 
implemented several aspects of Basel II as early as 
by 2008). Moreover, the argument for prevention of 
crises and maintenance of bank soundness is sup-
ported by the fact that banking crises in emerging 
economies have generally exceeded 25% of GDP, 
and are, proportionately, much larger in scale than 
in developed economies (Dissanayake, 2012a: 353-
354).
As mentioned above, from 1988 only the G-10 coun-
tries were involved in the Basel Committee. As late 
as in 2004, when Basel II was launched, no emerg-
God. XXIX, BR. 1/2016. str. 211-229
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ing economies were represented on the Committee. 
However, by 2009 the Committee had 27 members, 
including emerging countries such as Argentina and 
India. The geopolitical interests that dominate the 
accords are therefore evident. 
In fact, the Basel accords were neither made for the 
emerging economies nor intended to be applied in 
those economies. As far as Basel III is concerned, 
it is also clear that the accord has not addressed 
emerging economy concerns. The accord uses in-
dicators that are less suitable for assessing bank 
strength or soundness in emerging economies. It 
endorses using a capital buffer that consists of a cat-
egory of capital that has a lower quality in emerging 
economies.  
While Basel III has brought some positive changes 
from the perspective of the emerging economies, 
such as the counter cyclic buffer and the new rules 
on assessing credit rating agencies, the structure of 
the accord still falls far short of the specific needs 
of those economies. It is obvious that the emerging 
economies require a regulatory standard that would 
meet their needs. Applying any standard, without 
changes suited to the local context, can have dis-
astrous consequences on the health of banking 
systems in emerging economies. Therefore, it is 
necessary for regulators from emerging countries 
to engage in a discussion which will be either truly 
global, or will specifically cater to the needs of the 
emerging economies.
The problem of lack of skills and expertise in emerg-
ing economies is one that can be addressed by the 
Basel Committee. By establishing programs for 
sharing of technical skills and funding between 
countries, this issue can be solved. It will be in the 
interest of the global financial system to have a 
strong domestic regulatory apparatus in place, and 
therefore, the incentives for countries to participate 
in such a program are enormous. Furthermore, the 
role of credit rating agencies has been addressed to 
some extent in Basel III. It provides for reducing the 
role of credit rating agencies, which are not suitable 
for emerging economies (i.e. they exacerbate the 
crowding out effect, due to the structure and practi-
cal effect of the rules), by relying on internal rating 
systems. Unfortunately, many emerging economies 
lack sophisticated internal rating mechanisms and 
capacity due to lack of skills and expertise. If emerg-
ing economies are able to increase their skills and 
expertise, and encourage skills improvement within 
domestic firms, this will allow for reduced reliance 
on credit rating agencies. 
Rojas-Suarez’s recommendation for emerging 
economies to deepen the process of financial inter-
nationalisation through the increased participation 
of foreign institutional investors will meet several 
issues, as follows (Rojas-Suarez, 2002: 36): 
1. It will improve the quality of capital. 
2. It will improve market discipline by reducing 
the concentration of wealth.  
3. It will increase the market’s access to skills and 
expertise. 
For these reasons, this is particularly useful for all 
emerging economies in preparing themselves for 
the effects of Basel III. In order to increase market 
discipline, emerging economies would also need to 
restructure deposit insurance (taking into account 
the moral hazard associated with higher deposit 
insurance structures versus the large scale losses, 
loss of confidence, and bank runs associated with 
too little deposit insurance). In terms of increasing 
the minimum capital requirements of the accords, 
it appears that many emerging economies already 
impose much higher capital adequacy standards 
than required by Basel (e.g. Argentina just like Bos-
nia and Herzegovina 12%, India at the level of 9%). 
It is anticipated that the newest higher standards 
(minimum capital requirements plus capital buffer, 
10.5%) will push most emerging economies to in-
crease their regulatory capital requirements in or-
der to attract more deposits. 
The search for a regulatory standard that best fits 
the needs of emerging economies should continue, 
but both developed and emerging countries need to 
take steps to prevent negative effects. It is not only 
in the interests of emerging countries to do so, but 
also in the interests of developed countries, taking 
into account the interconnectedness of lending in 
today’s globalized financial world (Dissanayake, 
2012b: 378-385).
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3.2 Perspective of Basel III in the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Banking Sector
3.2.1 An Overview
The financial system in B&H is basically bank-
centric. The total assets of B&H financial assets 
are dominated by banks (see Figure 2). Moreover, 
the banks’ share is constantly on the increase (for 
example, according to the data at the end of 2006, 
80.69% of the assets of all financial institutions in 
B&H belonged to banks’ assets; this number in-
creased to 84.3% in 2010, while at the end of 2014 
it reached as much as 87.3%). Although the banking 
sector is basically healthy and stable, the fact that 
non-banking financial institutions (particularly in-
stitutional investors such as investment funds) are 
not developed does not contribute to the develop-
ment of financial markets (primarily capital mar-
kets), and consequently, to the further economic 
advancement of the country. 
Figure 2 Share of different types of financial insti-
tutions in the value of the financial system assets 
in B&H on 31/12/2014
There are 26 active commercial banks in B&H right 
now (17 in B&H Federation and 9 in Republic of 
Srpska), mainly under foreign private ownership. 
The leading B&H banks are de facto “branch offic-
es” of large European banks or subsidiaries of large 
European groups. This is why it is rather important 
to ensure unique rules for the “market competition” 
with regards to the European Union (EU) which 
B&H aims to join. This means that domestic regula-
tions need to be adjusted to the European ones, so 
that these banks would not leave the B&H banking 
market as a consequence of potential overregula-
tion. In other words, the implementation of globally 
harmonized Basel standards in B&H is even more 
significant.
The stability of the banking sector of B&H shall be 
discussed in this paper by means of certain indica-
tors belonging to the set of the so called financial 
soundness indicators, from the global financial cri-
sis onwards, as well as in the identical period prior 
to the crisis.7 Analytical reasons force us to take the 
end of 2008 as the period when the crisis “spilled 
over” to B&H, when B&H citizens withdrew some 
BAM 550 million, and the Central Bank of B&H, 
which functions under the currency board, reacted 
by reducing the rate of obligatory reserve from 18% 
to 14% (and later to 10%) on banks’ short term de
Source: The Central Bank of B&H, Financial stability report for 2014, p. 67,
(http://www.cbbh.ba/files/financial_stability_report/fsr_2014_bs.pdf )6
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Source: Authors
posits, while the rate of obligatory reserve for long 
term deposits is relatively stable at 7%. This made 
the banks’ BAM 722 million available for credit 
placing. The level of ensured deposits was increased 
from BAM 7,500 to 20,000, later to 35,000 until the 
current amount of BAM 50,000, which is still way 
below the EU average (EUR 100,000). 
Capital adequacy indicators
The banking sector in B&H is generally believed 
to be well capitalized, not only in terms of the net-
capital and risk-weighted assets ratio (minimum 
12%), but also in terms of the capital stock and risk-
weighted assets ratio. At the end of 2008, this ratio 
fell somewhat below 12% to 11.93%, which is illus-
trated in Figure 3. 
Assets quality indicators
The share of non-performing assets in the total as-
sets of the B&H banking sector in the observed pe-
riod, 2002-2014Q2, was the lowest in the pre-crisis 
year of 2007 (only 1.84%), while at the end of the 
first semester of 2014 it was as much as 11.96% and 
constantly increasing. 
Figure 4 The share of non-performing assets in the 
total assets of the B&H banking sector (in %)
Figure 3 Indicators of capital adequacy of the banking sector of B&H
Source: Authors
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Source: Authors
By analogy, while the share of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) in the total loans in the B&H banking sec-
tor was only 3.02% in 2007 (not far away from the 
average in developed countries which is 1-1.5%), it 
is somewhat over 15% nowadays, which is still sig-
nificantly lower than in other Western Balkan coun-
tries.8  
The trend of non-performing assets reduced by re-
serves to capital stock (Figure 6) as the third indica-
tor of asset quality was similar to the previous two.
Figure 6 The trend of non-performing assets re-
duced by reserves to capital stock of the banking 
sector of B&H
When the claim structure based on approved loans 
is observed, the largest share is taken by private 
non-financial companies and households, while the 
government sector takes only a minor part of the 
total claims. The average of claims for the period 
2002-2014Q2 is BAM 5.273 billion for companies, 
BAM 5.134 billion for households and BAM 1.250 
billion for government institutions.
The term structure of loans shows a faster growth of 
long term than short term loans, which forces banks 
to provide relatively stable and long term sources of 
financing (savings deposits take somewhat more 
than 50%). 
Figure 5 The share of non-performing loans in the total loans of the banking sector of B&H
Source: Authors
God. XXIX, BR. 1/2016. str. 211-229
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Source: Authors 
Figure 9 supports the thesis of a faster growth of 
long term rather than short term loans created by 
the banks in B&H. 
Indicators of banking sector profitability
The influence of the crisis on the real sector in B&H 
is still evident (including the influence of a-one-in-
a-century flooding that happened in May 2014). 
Figure 8 Term structure of loans
In the long run, this affects the growth of irrecover-
able debt, meaning debtors’ inability to service their 
loans, which requires larger reserves for potential 
credit losses and consequently increases costs (Fig-
ure 10) and reduces banks’ business results (Figure 
11).
The return on average shareholders’ equity of banks 
in B&H in 2010 was negative (-5.49%) due to a loss 
that occurred at the level of the total banking sector. 
After a significant improvement in 2011 and 2012, 
in 2013 this coefficient was still negative (-1.42%). 
Figure 7 Loan trend – sector structure, the banking sector of B&H
Source: Authors
Emira Kozarević, Nedžad Polić: Perspectives of Basel III: Empirical evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina  
God. XXIX, BR. 1/2016. str. 211-229
221
UDK: 336.71(497.6) / Review article 
Source: Authors
Indicators of banking sector liquidity
In principle, the liquidity of the B&H banking sector 
in the observed period is at a satisfactory level. The 
highest liquidity coefficient of 37.67%, measured by 
the ratio of liquid assets towards the total assets was 
registered in 2007. 
Figure 10 The share of net interest revenues and 
non interest spending in relation to the total re-
turn of the banking sector of B&H 
This shows that the banking sector was able to stand 
a reduced balance amount of 37.67%, which was the 
consequence of losing access to sources of financing 
or deposit withdrawal, before being forced to sell 
non liquid assets. In the following year of 2008, the 
growth of credit risk brings a sudden loss of confi-
dence in the banking system and deposit withdraw-
al. This led to problems with liquidity and a drop 
in the liquidity coefficient in the period 2008-2012, 
followed by a mild growth and then another drop in 
2013 and the first half of 2014, respectively.
Figure 9 Trend of total loans and term structure
Source: Authors
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3.2.2 Empirical Research
It should be emphasized that Basel I was reasonably 
implemented in the B&H banking sector, which 
guarantees the credibility of the banking sector, 
while the gradual implementation of Basel II is still 
underway. 
Figure 12 Trend of liquidity indicators of the ban-
king sector of B&H 
Implementation of Basel II principles was supposed 
to start at the end of 2008 (by the implementation 
of the Decision on minimum standards for manag-
ing operational risk at banks), to proceed in three 
stages (2009-2013, 2014-2016, and 2017-2018) and 
to be finalised by the end of 2018. However, the im-
plementation of this decision was prolonged until 
the end of 2009 in B&H Federation and mid-2010 
in Republic of Srpska. Experiences from around the 
world teach us that without the implementation of 
Basel II there is no implementation or prospects for 
Figure 11 Profitability of the banking sector of B&H
Source: Authors
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implementation of Basel III. For that purpose the 
empirical research was conducted to establish the 
progress and stage of implementation of the Basel 
II regulations in banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Methodology
The empirical research into the implementation of 
Basel II in BiH was conducted in mid-2012 using a 
questionnaire with 25 open/closed-ended questions 
and included 12 randomly chosen B&H banks. This 
research sample covered almost 50% of the B&H 
banks at that time, as two B&H banks were under 
receivership and two were entity’s development and 
not commercial banks.
The questionnaire consisted of three sections. 
The first section covered 11 questions aiming 
to get answers about the knowledge of the area 
and the application of Basel II in B&H banks. 
The second section covered 6 questions fo-
cused on the minimum capital requirements 
(Tier 1), examination of the current situation as 
well as finding suitable ways of improving the 
quality of non-performing bank offer-
ings in order to reduce the overall bank 
credit risk exposure. The third section cov-
ered the remaining 8 questions related to 
risk management issues, namely management of 
operational, market, and liquidity risks. 
Results and discussion
Although the survey results were analysed using 
descriptive and inferential statistics, only the key 
findings will be summarised here, due to article size 
limitations. This research led to the general conclu-
sion that the implementation is at stage one, with 
the following main observations:
• In all segments of implementation, the largest 
progress was indicated by the domestic banks 
that were related to large parent banks and con-
sequently had an easier access to implementation, 
with clear instructions and support by the head-
quarters. 
• On the other hand, the banks not related to the 
large foreign banks indicated small or no progress 
in terms of Basel II implementation.
• In terms of regulators, the defined action plan did 
not include clearly constructed segments which 
banks should have already implemented. Thus, 
it was difficult to draw parallels between the 
planned and the implemented at the particular 
point in time. 
• Banks belonging to larger groups seriously ac-
cepted the process of Basel II implementation, 
and with assistance of parent banks made head-
way in implementation, even beyond regulators’ 
requirements. 
• Banks with lower assets, whose results were dev-
astating in the context of Basel II implementation, 
would have to improve and speed up implemen-
tation by 2014, when stage two of Basel II imple-
mentation starts, so as to adapt their business 
activities to regulators requirements.
• Inability to check or harmonize the past pro-
cesses between banks and regulators was also 
one of the aspects that should be taken into ac-
count more in the future. The reason for this 
lies in the structure of banks operating in B&H, 
which is rather diverse; some banks in the imple-
mentation of Basel II principles would progress 
ahead of their regulators, while others would lag 
behind. All this certainly depends on the size of 
parent banks, since they certainly went through 
year-long preparations for Basel II implementa-
tion and could transfer their experiences to the 
daughter banks in B&H. 
• Education is indeed the segment which requires 
constant updates regarding Basel II implementa-
tion, since B&H is certainly faced with a long way 
to reach the final organization of the financial and 
banking system in particular, according to the 
Basel Committee requirements. This is also the 
segment in which smaller banks would have to 
invest more effort, taking into consideration that 
they need to hire experts to raise their employees’ 
knowledge to the level which would enable high-
quality implementation of Basel. 
• There are a certain number of banks aspiring to 
a more advanced approach to credit risk meas-
urement. It is thus very important to monitor in 
the future which banks would really be able to ap-
ply such an approach, bearing in mind numerous 
preconditions that need to be fulfilled. 
• Although most banks opted for the basic ap-
proach for operational risk measurement, one 
must bear in mind that operational risk manage-
ment in B&H banks is still at the beginning stage. 
Therefore, banks may decide to use the basic ap-
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proach, but still not taking into account whether 
or not this is a good way to reach the appropriate 
capital requirements. 
• In stage two of implementation, more attention 
should be paid on identifying, measuring, and 
managing other types of risk, such as market risk, 
liquidity risk, etc.
• Basel II implementation is certainly one of the 
most important events marking this decade in the 
banking sector in B&H. Its transfer is expected to 
last for a longer period of time and the Accord 
itself would certainly experience some changes, 
bound to occur at the beginning of 2013 in the 
developed part of the world, with the introduc-
tion of Basel III. However, the most important 
thing for the banks in B&H is to adapt their busi-
ness activities to the requirements imposed by 
Basel II, due to the fact that its implementation 
contributes to the stability of the financial system 
on the macro level, as well as encourages banks 
to improve their risk management system on the 
micro level. 
• As previously stated, regardless of all the progress 
made over the three-year period, the process of 
reforms ahead of this sector is expected to be a 
long one. Supervisors are yet to do a lot of work 
and face many challenges on the road to the im-
plementation of Basel II or Basel III. The biggest 
challenges awaiting supervisors would include 
the need to increase the supervisory body so 
that all the relevant risks on the market would be 
monitored as well as the inappropriate develop-
ment of other parts of the financial system and 
management in the public finance sector, which 
transfer risks onto the banking sector. 
3.2.3 Regulatory Findings
In mid-2013, the Agency for Banking of B&H Feder-
ation9 conducted the so called Preliminary study of 
the quantitative effect of standardized approach im-
plementation for calculating capital requirements 
for credit risk in B&H Federation (QIS)10, using the 
technique of questionnaire on the population of 17 
commercial banks (banks from Republic of Srpska 
were not included in this research). Naming some of 
the positive consequences of Basel II implementa-
tion, banks set apart the following: 
• lower capital requirements; 
• increased coefficient of capital adequacy; 
• improved collateral management;
• better risk control and management;
• decreased capital requirements due to allowing 
for collateral, implementation of credit risk miti-
gation (CRM) techniques; 
• more precise and realistic calculation of capital 
adequacy; 
• increased capital requirements for higher ex-
posure to risks and decreased requirements for 
lower risk exposure, etc.
Banks also mentioned some of the negative conse-
quences of Basel II implementation as follows:  
• significant investment in development or pur-
chase of software solutions; 
• movable assets that banks take as collateral are 
not considered an acceptable type of insurance 
when calculating capital requirements;
• large investment particularly evident when intro-
ducing advanced approaches;
• additional investment into IT infrastructure and 
human resources, etc.
The question now arises in terms of objective ex-
pectations of the possibility to accept Basel III in the 
B&H banking sector, regarding the fact that the tim-
ing of complete implementation of Basel II in B&H 
coincides with the planned deadline for complete 
implementation of Basel II in the developed part of 
the world as well as the fact that Basel III draws on 
Basel II. 
Intuitively speaking, Basel III does not necessar-
ily need to have strong consequences on the real 
or corporate sector in B&H, since the rate of capi-
tal adequacy, as stipulated by the Law on Banks in 
B&H Federation and Republic of Srpska, is 12% 
(by 50% higher than the international standard). 
Besides, due to the undeveloped financial market, 
B&H banks hold the largest part of their capital as 
primary (shareholders’ equity and retained profits) 
rather than secondary (subordinated shares, val-
orisation reserves, etc.). This is most probably why 
many of the banks already fulfil new, stricter capital 
requirements. Unlike them, as estimated by the BIS, 
the world’s largest banks should gather a total of 
EUR 374 billion of additional capital so as to reach 
the Basel III defined rate of capital stock adequacy 
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of 7%. Due to the banks’ gathering the capital and 
retaining profit, aimed at the increase of the capital 
stock, analysts emphasize that Basel III implemen-
tation in the short term might result in the negative 
effects of consumption, investment, and economic 
growth. However, in the long term, they believe that 
the implementation of Basel III standards would 
yield more stable business activities with less risk in 
the banking sector. 
In terms of liquidity requirements, economic analy-
sis almost generally state that B&H banks are too 
liquid (for example in 2013 they had EUR 700 mil-
lion over the required level) and that minimum 
standards for liquidity risk management in the B&H 
banking sector were even stricter than the globally 
harmonized regulations.  
However, potential consistency with the latest regu-
latory regime for the banks situated in B&H that are 
not under foreign private ownership would require 
significant investment in the following: 
• software solutions, for example, the regulations 
define the implementation of approaches based 
on internal rating systems for credit risk instead 
of the past standardized one, or the advanced 
measurement approach for operational risk in-
stead of the past basic indicator approach, while 
smaller banks in B&H, due to the nature of their 
activities and risk profile, do not prefer sophisti-
cated products and complex calculations of capi-
tal requirements for certain risks; 
• education of not only bank employees but also 
supervisory staff; 
• establishment of institutional capacities within 
agencies; 
• significant amount of new information and their 
storage, etc.11 
Basically, any bigger regulatory reform will include 
harmonization costs which B&H banks could not 
avoid. These are only some of the aspects which the 
Central Bank of B&H in cooperation with the entity 
banking agencies and experts of international finan-
cial institutions (the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank) will need to consider when 
making the decision on the implementation of Ba-
sel III principles in the B&H banking sector – before 
or after the total implementation of Basel II, which 
leaves an open question. 
4. Conclusion and Recommendations
Banking regulation has strong impact on the econ-
omy, financial intermediation, and the overall per-
ception of the financial system. As capital adequacy 
is one of the main indicators of the strength and 
soundness of banks, the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision has promoted “global” (harmo-
nised) standards in the banking business ever since 
its inception in 1988. Nowadays, the credibility of 
the banking sector of any country is largely judged 
by the degree to which Basel capital standards have 
been implemented in the banks’ business activities. 
Although the Basel Committee includes around 30 
members, the Basel rules have been accepted as 
standard by more than 100 countries. 
While the countries of the developed part of 
the world started Basel II implementation on 
31/12/2006, the implementation in other countries 
is at various stages of progress. Basel II is considered 
the most important and complex change related to 
risk management for banks in the past 50 years. The 
main focus of Basel II is the parallel “construction” 
of three pillars into banking activities. The first one 
is related to risk evaluation, not only credit and 
market, but also operational risks as well, while the 
second pillar is related to risk management or the 
process of supervisory review. The final, third pillar 
is related to risk transparency or market discipline. 
Ultimately, regulators want Basel II to be imple-
mented as a standard so that the bank’s exposure to 
risks would be measured by sophisticated methods/
approaches and balanced with appropriate sources 
for their absorption (capital in particular). 
However, the global financial crisis (2007-2009) 
highlighted some of the inherent weaknesses of Ba-
sel II and opened it to criticism, namely for the over-
confidence in the quality of statistical risk measures 
and tools, risk management herding, liquidity risk 
neglect, etc. As a result, the regulators at the Ba-
sel Committee in June 2010 reached a consensus 
on a new (latest) accord – Basel III. The Basel III 
Accord is characterized as a successive process by 
which banks are expected to increase the primary 
capital ratio from 2% to 7%. Although Basel III basi-
cally draws on Basel II, it introduces certain changes 
in the structure of the obligatory capital (primarily 
the capital buffer, 2.5% in common stocks), liquidity 
risk management, banks’ leverage ratio, etc. Its full 
implementation in developed countries is expected 
as early as at the beginning of 2019. 
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Reactions to Basel III have been both positive and 
negative, but its actual impact will not be known for 
several years. Furthermore, despite the fact that Ba-
sel III standards are intended for implementation by 
internationally active banks and in developed econ-
omies, other economies (and, therefore, emerging) 
are also forced to implement the accord due to in-
ternational regulatory and competition reasons. But 
the real truth is that Basel accords in general have 
not yet addressed emerging economy concerns. 
As far as Basel III is concerned, it uses indicators 
that are less suitable for assessing bank soundness 
in emerging economies. It endorses using capital 
buffer that consists of a category of capital that has 
lower quality in emerging economies. In addition, 
there is a serious problem of lack of skills and exper-
tise in emerging economies, which further hinders 
the overall compliance efforts.  
In terms of B&H, it is generally known that its bank-
ing sector is the healthiest segment of the overall 
(bank-centric) financial system. Although the B&H 
banking sector is well capitalized (the rate of capital 
adequacy is constantly above the requested 12%), it 
is evident that NPLs continuously increase due to 
higher business risks of B&H companies, which is 
primarily the consequence of recessive economic 
trends worldwide (including one-in-a-century 
flooding in B&H in May 2014). For banks the NPL 
growth means higher reserves for potential credit 
losses, resulting in higher reserve costs and lower 
business results (even negative in 2010 and 2013).
Basel II implementation in B&H is currently at stage 
one for the private banks with domestic ownership 
or at stage two mostly for the private banks with 
primarily foreign ownership (the former ones do 
not even use sophisticated products which require 
the change in advanced measurement approaches). 
This causes large costs for banks, in terms of tech-
nology support, education (employees and regula-
tors/supervisors), management of information etc. 
Since the full implementation, which has already 
been under significant delays, is planned for the 
end of 2018, the question now arises whether or 
not it is possible to start implementing principles 
of the latest accord before this deadline. The ques-
tion remains open and it must be answered by the 
Central Bank of B&H and entity banking agencies, 
after some serious consulting with the experts of 
international financial institutions, especially since 
meeting the Basel III standards might be “mission 
impossible” for smaller domestic banks. 
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(Endnotes)
1 Twenty-one systemic banking crises took place in the period 2007-2009, and some are not yet over. What is interesting, these crises 
took place in the most industrialised countries in the world, most of which are the oldest stakeholders in the Basel Committee. 
 In that regard, Basel regulators have received widespread criticism for failing to prevent two credit crises that hit the U.S. over the 
last two decades. Nonetheless, banks were considerably overcapitalized prior to the onset of the 2007-2009 subprime crisis compa-
red to those which had undergone the 1990-1991 recession. Therefore, if capital requirements were achieved prior to the subprime 
crisis, how could the Basel framework be blamed again for having accelerated if not caused another credit crunch? Cathcart, El-Jahel 
& Jabbour (2015, pp. 112-123) find that the answer to this question lies in the relationship between the capital ratio and the leverage 
ratio which is governed by risk-weights categories determined by the Basel regulation. They show that changes to risk-weight catego-
ries which affect the correlation pattern between both ratios are not reflected in the subprime crisis. This minimizes the implication 
of the Basel II regulation in the crunch that succeeded its announcement, in contrast to Basel I.
2 In other words, the Accord introduces a liquidity coverage ratio so that banks hold enough liquid assets to be converted into cash to 
meet liquidity needs for 30 days. This test is to be a minimum requirement. The liquidity requirement, however, should be introduced 
only in 2015. Liquidity itself is hailed by Basel as one of the more important innovations introduced by the new accord.
3 Market capitalization is the product of the total number of issued shares and the current market price of a share of the financial 
company (Šverko, 2002, p. 646). 
4 The Z-score is computed as the return on assets (ROA) plus the capital-asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. 
It measures the distance from insolvency. Insolvency is defined as a state where losses surmount equity. Thus, the Z-score repre-
sents the number of standard deviations that a bank’s ROA has to drop below its expected value before equity is depleted. 
 
where ROA - the return on assets, CAR - the capital-asset ratio (equity/assets); σ(ROA) - the standard deviation of ROA.
5 Gavalas (2015, pp. 21-37) found that assuming a 1.3 percentage point increase in the equity-to-asset ratio to meet the Basel III regula-
tions, the country-by-country estimations imply a reduction in the volume of loans by an average 4.97 percent in the long run for the 
banks in countries that experienced a crisis and by 18.67 percent for the banks in countries that did not experience a crisis.
6 Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2015), “Financial Stability Report for 2014”, Available at: http://www.cbbh.ba/files/financi-
al_stability_report/fsr_2014_bs.pdf (Accessed on: August 9, 2015).
7 The basis for the formulation and calculation of financial soundness indicator is given in the IMF Financial Soundness Indicators 
Compilation Guide in 2006. 
8 When the countries of the region are concerned, the largest share of NPLs in the total loan sum, according to the 2012 data, was 
in Montenegro 21% (with solvency coefficient of 10%), lately decreased from 15.85% to 8.96%, followed by Serbia with the share of 
18.8%. In Albania the NPL share is 16.6% while in Croatia it was 12.2%. In Slovenia, one fifth of the assets (20%) is made of NPLs, 
which is EUR 9.7 billion. 
9 Agency for banking of B&H Federation (FBA), (2013), “Preliminary study of the quantitative impact of the application of the standar-
dized approach to calculate capital requirements for credit risk in Federation of B&H (QIS)”, Available at: http://www.fba.ba/images/
Publikacije_Banke/Preliminarna_studija_QIS_bos.pdf (Accessed on: December 19, 2014).
10  For more details, see: http://www.fba.ba/images/Publikacije_Banke/Preliminarna_studija_QIS_bos.pdf. 
11 Alongside two supplementary capital buffers, the Basel Committee imposed severe pressure on the Value-at-Risk based Internal Mo-
dels Approach in order to increase. This is to increase the capital base by adding the stressed Value-at-Risk component in an effort to 
reduce reliance on internal models while keeping the Standardized Approach avenue open. However, even though those measures 
might appear theoretically correct, evidence gathered for long and short exposures in Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain highlights 
several defects in Basel III. Rossignolo, Fethi & Shaban (2013, pp. 1323-1339) emphasized that leptokurtic models, primarily those 
derived from Extreme Value Theory, should be enforced in the regulations given their superior performance in market crises, and that 
Basel II could have shielded against 2008 mayhem provided that heavy-tailed techniques had been employed. Furthermore, Rossi-
gnolo, Fethi & Shaban (2012, pp. 303-319) suggested that the inclusion of Extreme Value (EV) in planned supervisory accords should 
reduce development costs and foster healthier financial structures.
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Nedžad Polić
Perspektive Basela III:
Empirijski dokazi iz Bosne i Hercegovine
Sažetak
Posljednji baselski sporazum, koji se oslanja na Novi sporazum o kapitalu (tzv. Basel II) i čiji su osnovni 
ciljevi, normativno gledano, poboljšanje sposobnosti bankovnoga sektora da apsorbira gubitke proistekle 
iz ekonomskih neprilika poput globalne financijske krize (2007. -2009.), poboljšanje upravljanja rizicima 
i upravljanja uopće te jačanje transparentnosti i objavljivanja od strane banaka, operativno promatrano, 
naglašava potrebu da se unaprijede kvaliteta i kvantiteta komponenti kapitala, standardi likvidnosti i leveridž 
racio. Implementacija Sporazuma u razvijenim zemljama započela je početkom 2013. godine, a ukupni 
prijelazni period od okvira Basela II treba završiti do 2019. godine. Kada su u pitanju zemlje s tržištima u 
nastajanju, postoji nekoliko pitanja na putu njegove implementacije, kao što su  potrebne (tehničke) vještine 
i ekspertiza osoblja banaka, kao i njihovih supervizorskih institucija, sofisticirani mehanizmi i kapacitet za 
interno rangiranje, značajna količina novih informacija i evidencija itd. U ovome radu, stoga se diskutira o 
stvarnim i potencijalnim učincima Basela III, prvo u razvijenim zemljama, a zatim i zemljama s tržištima u 
nastajanju. Poseban naglasak stavljen je na bankovni sektor Bosne i Hercegovine.
Ključne riječi: međunarodni bankovni standardi, baselski sporazumi, Basel III, učinci, razvijene zemlje, 
zemlje s tržištima u nastajanju, Bosna i Hercegovina
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